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Abstract Data-driven tools and techniques, particularly ma-
chine learning methods that underpin artificial intelligence,
offer promise in improving healthcare systems and services.
One of the companies aspiring to pioneer these advances is
DeepMind Technologies Limited, a wholly-owned subsidiary
of the Google conglomerate, Alphabet Inc. In 2016,
DeepMind announced its first major health project: a collab-
oration with the Royal Free LondonNHS Foundation Trust, to
assist in the management of acute kidney injury. Initially re-
ceived with great enthusiasm, the collaboration has suffered
from a lack of clarity and openness, with issues of privacy and
power emerging as potent challenges as the project has un-
folded. Taking the DeepMind-Royal Free case study as its
pivot, this article draws a number of lessons on the transfer
of population-derived datasets to large private prospectors,
identifying critical questions for policy-makers, industry and
individuals as healthcare moves into an algorithmic age.
Keywords Artificial intelligence . Clinical care . Consent .
Data protection .Machine learning . Power . Privacy .
Regulation
1 Introduction
A key trend in contemporary healthcare is the emergence of an
ambitious new cadre of corporate entrants: digital technology
companies. Google, Microsoft, IBM, Apple and others are all
preparing, in their own ways, bids on the future of health and
on various aspects of the global healthcare industry.
This article focuses on the Google conglomerate, Alphabet
Inc. (referred to as Google for convenience). We examine the
first healthcare deals of its British-based artificial intelligence
subsidiary, DeepMind Technologies Limited,1 in the period
between July 2015 andOctober 2016.2 In particular, the article
assesses the first year of a deal between Google DeepMind
and the Royal Free London NHS Foundation Trust, which
involved the transfer of identifiable patient records across
the entire Trust, without explicit consent, for the purpose of
developing a clinical alert app for kidney injury. We identify
inadequacies in the architecture of this deal, in its public com-
munication, and in the processes of public sector oversight.
We conclude that, from the perspective of patient autonomy,
public value, and long-term competitive innovation, existing
institutional and regulatory responses are insufficiently robust
and agile to properly respond to the challenges presented by
data politics and the rise of algorithmic tools in healthcare.
The article proceeds in three main sections. The next
two sections document comprehensively how the
DeepMind deals proceeded, drawing attention to the dis-
closures and omissions in how data handling was commu-
nicated, justified and, ultimately, scrutinized in public.
Section 2 discusses the chronology, formal contractual
1 Since Oct 2015, DeepMind has been owned by Google’s parent company,
Alphabet Inc.
2 Given the time period considered, the EU’s General Data Protection
Regulation 2016/679, which enters into force in May 2018, is beyond the
scope of this article.
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basis, and stated clinical motivation underlying the Royal
Free deal, highlighting the delayed revelation of the na-
ture and scale of patient data involved. Section 3 explores
DeepMind’s broader ambitions in working with the NHS
and the lack of ex ante discussions and authorizations
with relevant regulators. It also elaborates on the problem-
atic basis on which data was shared by Royal Free, name-
ly, the assertion that DeepMind maintains a direct care
relationship with every patient in the Trust. Section 4 then
lays out the lessons that can be drawn from the case study
as a whole, assesses at a high level the data protection and
medical information governance issues, and then turns to
transparency, data value, and market power.
2 A startup and a revelation
In July 2015, clinicians from British public hospitals
within the Royal Free London NHS Foundation Trust
approached Google DeepMind Technologies Limited,
an artificial intelligence company with no experience
in providing healthcare services, about developing soft-
ware using patient data from the Trust [1]. Four months
later, on 18 November 2015, [2] sensitive medical data
on millions [3] of Royal Free’s patients started flowing
into third-party servers contracted by Google to process
data on behalf of DeepMind [4].
Royal Free is one of the largest healthcare providers in
Britain’s publicly funded National Health Service (NHS).
The NHS offers healthcare that is free at the point of
service, paid for through taxes and national insurance
contributions. Beloved in the UK, the NHS is a key
part of the national identity.
DeepMind publicly announced its work with Royal
Free on 24 February 2016 [5]. No mention was made
of the volume or kind of data included in the transfer—
millions of identifiable personal medical records.
DeepMind said it was building a smartphone app, called
‘Streams’, to help clinicians manage acute kidney injury
(AKI). AKI has outcomes ranging from minor kidney
dysfunction through to dialysis, transplant, and even
death, and is linked to 40,000 deaths a year in the
UK [6, 7]. The app, DeepMind claimed, would not ap-
ply any of the machine learning or artificial intelligence
techniques (effectively, statistical models built using
powerful computing resources over large corpora of
granular, personalized data [8]) for which it is re-
nowned, and would act as a mere interface to patient
medical data controlled by Royal Free [9]. Why
DeepMind, an artificial intelligence company wholly
owned by data mining and advertising giant Google,
was a good choice to build an app that functions pri-
marily as a data-integrating user interface, has never
been adequately explained by either DeepMind or
Royal Free.
2.1 Contractual foundations vs public relations
Throughout the whole first phase of the deal, through to
October 2016, DeepMind’s publicly announced purposes
for holding sensitive data on Royal Free’s patients, i.e.
the management and direct care of AKI, were narrower
than the purposes that contractually constrained its use
of the data. These constraints were described in an eight
page information sharing agreement (ISA) between
Google UK Limited and Royal Free, signed on 29
September 2015 [4]. The Google-Royal Free ISA stated
that, in addition to developing tools for ‘Patient Safety
Alerts for AKI’ (presumably via the application now
badged as Streams), Google, through DeepMind, could
also build Breal time clinical analytics, detection, diag-
nosis and decision support to support treatment and
avert clinical deterioration across a range of diagnoses
and organ systems^ [10]. Further, it stated that the data
provided by Royal Free was envisaged for use in the
creation of a service termed ‘Patient Rescue’, Ba proof
of concept technology platform that enables analytics as
a service for NHS Hospital Trusts^.
This was the entirety of the language in the ISA specifying
the purposes for data sharing between Royal Free and Google
over a two-year period ending 29 September 2017. (The ISA
was superseded, prematurely, by a new set of agreements
signed on 10 November 2016. Those agreements are beyond
the scope of the present article and will be considered in future
work.) At least contractually, the original ISA seemed to per-
mit DeepMind to build systems to target any illness or part of
the body. Further, the ISA contained no language constraining
the use of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies on the data,
meaning that DeepMind’s assurance that Bfor the moment
there’s no AI or machine learning^ was, and remains, rather
less convincing than Bbut we don’t rule it out for the future^
[9]. In mid-2016, the app’s online FAQs reiterated the same
sentiment, adding that if artificial intelligence techniques
are applied to the data in the future, this would be
announced on the company’s website, and indicating
that the company will seek regulatory approval under
research authorization processes [11].
Another subject unaddressed in the ISA was the Google
question: i.e. how data shared under the scheme would be
cabined from other identifiable data stored by Google, given
that Google was the signing party to the contract and that the
company’s business model depends on monetizing personal
data. DeepMind has made regular public assurances that
Royal Free data Bwill never be linked or associated with
Google accounts , products or services^ [9, 12] .
Problematically, these assurances appear to have been given
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little to no legal foundation in Google and DeepMind’s deal-
ings with Royal Free,3 even if there is no reason to disbelieve
the sincerity of their intent [13]. The reality is that the exact
nature and extent of Google’s interests in NHS patient data
remain ambiguous.
2.2 Data, direct care and consent
It is important to note that, though the ISA provided Google
with a broad set of purposes contractually, it did not displace
various other legal, regulatory and ethical restrictions. A perti-
nent restriction is that medical information governance in the
UK is geared around obtaining explicit consent from each pa-
tient whose identifiable data is passed to a third-party, when that
third-party is not in a direct care relationship with the patient in
question.4 Direct care is defined as Ban activity concerned with
the prevention, investigation and treatment of illness and the
alleviation of suffering of an identified individual^ [14].
The data that DeepMind processed under the Royal Free
project was transferred to it without obtaining explicit consent
from—or even giving any notice to—any of the patients in the
dataset. For patients who had the necessary precursor renal
blood test and were then progressed to being monitored by
clinicians for AKI, the appropriate direct care relationship
would exist to justify this data processing, through the vehicle
of implied consent. However, the dataset transferred to
DeepMind extended much more broadly than this. In fact, it
included every patient admission, discharge and transfer within
constituent hospitals of Royal Free over a more than five-year
period (dating back to 2010). For all the people in the dataset
who are never monitored for AKI, or who have visited the
hospital in the past, ended their episode of care and not
returned, consent (explicit or implied) and notice were lacking.
This is an issue to which we will return, given the centrality of
these requirements to patient privacy and meaningful agency.
On 29 April 2016, the extent of data held by DeepMind was
revealed following a New Scientist investigation [15]. Google,
which acted as the media filter for its subsidiary until at least
October 2016, issued a swift public relations response. In all of
its communications, Google insisted that it would not be using
the full scope of the ISA it had signed [15], emphasizing that
DeepMind was only developing an app for monitoring kidney
disease [16]. This was despite the clear statements in the ISA
quoted above, i.e. that information was also being shared for
the development of real time analysis and alert systems, poten-
tially as part of a broadly-defined ‘analytics as a service’
platform. On 4 May 2016, Royal Free issued a statement in
line with Google’s position [17].
The data package described in the ISA and destined for
DeepMind is patient identifiable, and includes the results of every
blood test done at Royal Free in the five years prior to transfer
[18]. It also includes demographic details and all electronic pa-
tient records of admissions and discharges from critical care and
accident and emergency. It includes diagnoses for conditions and
procedures that have a contributory significance to AKI, such as
diabetes, kidney stones, appendectomies or renal transplants, but
also those that do not, such as setting broken bones.
2.3 A ‘national algorithm’ for AKI
Both DeepMind and Royal Free claim that Streams relies
solely on a ‘national algorithm’ for AKI published by the
NHS [19]; a process designed to assist in the rapid diagnosis
of AKI from the starting point of a renal blood test for creat-
inine levels [20]. The implication is that all that Streams does
is host this algorithm, and pump the Royal Free data (as
stored, structured, formatted and delivered by DeepMind)
through it to generate alerts [21, 11].5 These alerts are trans-
mitted to a clinician’s mobile device, along with historical data
on the patient in question to analyze trends (in seeming con-
tradiction to the ISA, which stated that historical information
was shared only Bto aid service evaluation and audit on the
AKI product^). Adding any new functions to the app, or ful-
filling any of the broader contractual purposes described in the
ISA, would comprise research. DeepMind did not have the
requisite approvals for research from the Health Research
Authority (HRA) and, in the case of identifiable data in par-
ticular, the Confidentiality Advisory Group (CAG) [22, 23].
Because DeepMind’s processes and servers—and those of the
third-party datacenter holding the data—have not been inde-
pendently scrutinized and explained, what the company has
been, and is actually, doing with the data is not public.
The national AKI algorithmwas launched in a patient safety
alert put out by NHS England on 9 June 2014, recommending
Bthe wide scale introduction and uptake of an automated com-
puter software algorithm to detect AKI^ [24]. The algorithm
was standardized by a working group of nephrologists and
biochemists, with inputs from providers of specialized labora-
tory software systems, and leads to results being generated in
Royal Free’s laboratory information management system [25].
DeepMind’s asserted role has been to design a clinical app to
get the alerts generated by this algorithm delivered to clinicians
‘on the fly’. The algorithm does not, however, extend to pa-
tients who have never been tested for serum creatinine, nor
does it mention historical contextual data [26, 27]. It is only
an assistant to good clinical care [28, 29], and its sensitivity and
3 There is no prohibition on linkage in the ISA. DeepMind’s own internal
privacy impact assessment (see section 3.3 below) states that no new linkages
of data will be made, but this document has no legal force, and given its other
shortcomings––i.e. that it does not deal with the bulk of the data transfer, nor
the bulk of the individuals affected––we do not consider it adequate.
4 See discussion of consent in section 4.2-4.3 below.
5 The Streams FAQ states that “all development is done using synthetic
(mock) data. Clinical data is used for testing purposes”.
Health Technol.
effectiveness remains a vibrant, contested field of research. As
DeepMind has acknowledged, Bthe national algorithm can
miss cases of AKI, can misclassify their severity, and can label
some as having AKI when they don’t^ [30]. The failure to
explain and address these issues and, in particular, the discon-
nect between the Trust-wide dataset that has been transferred
under the broad terms of the ISA and the narrower set of
patients who will ever be monitored and treated for AKI,
throws considerable doubt on the DeepMind-Royal Free posi-
tion that all of the data being transferred is necessary and pro-
portionate to the safe and effective care of each individual
patient [31, 32].
3 Grand designs and governance gaps
Between late April 2016, when the scale of the data transfer
from Royal Free to DeepMind and the relative lack of con-
straints on its use became publicly known, and until at least
October 2016, DeepMind and Royal Free maintained the nar-
rative that the entire purpose of transferring millions of patient
records was to assist with AKI diagnosis and alerts, under a
relationship of direct patient care [33]. This position, however,
fails to justify both the initial breadth of the data transfer and
the continued data retention.
3.1 Questioning direct care
Royal Free states that AKI affects Bmore than one in six in-
patients^ [17].6 If, as DeepMind claims, it only uses patient
data in the service of monitoring and treating AKI, then it
follows that as many as five sixths of patients (though this
quantity is very unclear on the current state of the evidence)
are not in a direct care relationship with the company. The
distinction between being monitored or treated for AKI and
not being monitored matters, because under British medical
information governance guidelines [34], a direct care relation-
ship between an identified patient and an identified clinical
professional or member of a clinical care team obviates the
need for explicit consent. Without such a direct care relation-
ship, however, and without another basis such as consent, a
formal research authorization from the HRA CAG, or other-
wise satisfying necessity requirements and introducing appro-
priate safeguards [35], it is unlawful to continue to process
patient data under the UK Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA).
As already noted, DeepMind has held data on millions of
Royal Free patients and former patients since November 2015,
with neither consent, nor research approval. The company, with
the support of Royal Free, has elected to position itself as hav-
ing a direct care relationship, by virtue of its AKI alert app, with
each and every one of those patients. Drawing boundaries
around the patients who are in a direct care relationship is not
likely to be as clean as saying that it extends only to those who
contract AKI, since the purpose of the app also includes mon-
itoring. However, since the large, Trust-wide group whose data
has been transferred includes individuals who have never had a
blood test, never been tested or treated for kidney injury, or
indeed patients who have since left the constituent hospitals
or even passed away, the position that Royal Free and
DeepMind assert—that the company is preventing, investigat-
ing or treating kidney disease in every patient—seems difficult
to sustain on any reasonable interpretation of direct patient care.
3.2 Grand ambitions and systemic change
Despite the public narrative’s exclusive focus on AKI, it is
clear that DeepMind and Royal Free have always had designs
on much grander targets. A memorandum of understanding
(MOU) between DeepMind and Royal Free was signed on 28
January 2016, though was only discussed for the first time in
June 2016, after being uncovered by a freedom of information
request [36]. The document, which is not legally binding, talks
about plans for DeepMind to develop new systems for Royal
Free as part of a Bbroad ranging, mutually beneficial partner-
ship… to work on genuinely innovative and transformational
projects^ [37]. Quarterly meetings are envisaged for the set-
ting of priorities on product development, including real time
prediction of risks of deterioration, death or readmission, bed,
demand and task management, junior doctor deployment/
private messaging, and the reading of cardiotocography traces
in labor [38]. Although the MOU states that all such projects
will be governed by their own individual agreements, the ini-
tial Royal Free ISA already covers DeepMind for the devel-
opment of a wide range of medical tools.
These are vast ambitions, considerably out of step with
DeepMind and Royal Free’s narrow public relations orienta-
tion towards their collaboration being entirely founded on
direct care for AKI. TheMOU alsomakes apparent the esteem
in which DeepMind is held by its public service partners,
indicating in the principles under which the parties intend to
cooperate that one of the major reasons for Royal Free’s de-
sired collaboration is BReputational gain from a strategic alli-
ance with an unrivalled partner of the highest profile and ex-
pertise, focused on a highly impactful mission^, plus a Bplace
at the vanguard of developments in… one of the most prom-
ising technologies in healthcare^. DeepMind, by contrast, is in
it for rather more sombre reasons: a clinical and operational
test-bed, a strategic steer in product development and, most of
all, for data for machine learning research.
Nascent indications of DeepMind’s plans for datasets that
not only span a large healthcare trust such as Royal Free, but
the entire NHS, have not yet received critical discussion [39],
but can be seen in presentations given throughout 2016 by
DeepMind cofounder and health lead, Mustafa Suleyman.6 This seems an upper estimate on the clinical reality: see [6].
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These presentations have elaborated a vision for a Btruly dig-
ital NHS^, comprising Bmassively improved patient care, ac-
tionable analytics, advanced research both at the hospital-wide
level and the population-wide level, and an open innovation
ecosystem^ [40]. Suleyman characterizes this fourth element,
underpinned technically by Bdigitizing most of the data that’s
exchanged across the [NHS] system, open standards, and true
interoperability ,^ as Bthe key pivotal thing^ Bthat will enable
us to bring a wide variety of providers into the system and for
clinicians up and down the country to be able to commission
much smaller, more nimble, startup-like organizations to pro-
vide some of the long tail of specialist and niche applications
that nurses and doctors are asking for^ [40]. At the core of
Suleyman’s described vision is the Bsecure and controlled re-
lease of data^ from what he terms Ba single, back-end canon-
ical record^ that indexes, but also gives a degree of control to,
all patients [41]—a telling sign of where a trust-wide dataset,
retrofitted in a way that allows it to be leveraged by Google/
DeepMind products and those of other technology companies,
might ultimately be directed.
These statements are considerably broader than
DeepMind and Royal Free’s public relations focus on
the Streams AKI app, with very extensive implications
deserving of full and rigorous consideration. As
Suleyman describes it, the Bvery specific^ targeting of
AKI under Streams precedes a Breal opportunity for us
to go much much further and extend this to a broader
patient-centric collaboration platform^ [41]. Part of how
this would be achieved technically, he indicated, was by
making patient health data repurposable through an appli-
cation programming interface termed FHIR (Fast
Healthcare Interoperability Resources; pronounced ‘fire’);
an open, extensible standard for exchanging electronic
health records. The FHIR API, Suleyman indicated in
July 2016, allows Baggregating the data in the back-end
despite the fact that it is often spread across a hundred
plus databases of different schemas and in different stan-
dards and in many hospitals^. He continued, Bthis is ac-
tually very tractable… it’s not a research problem, and
we’ve actually had some success in starting to think about
how we might do that, with the Royal Free^ [41].
By September 2016, Suleyman was pitching DeepMind
at the heart of a new vision for the NHS––and casting the
Google-Royal Free collaboration in the terms that Google
and DeepMind had vigorously denied and critics had
feared (i.e. something much broader than an app for kid-
ney injury, giving Google and DeepMind undue and anti-
competitive leverage over the NHS [15]), highlighting
sharply DeepMind’s unsatisfactory and quite possibly un-
lawful processing and repurposing of Trust-wide Royal
Free data. Speaking at Nesta’s annual FutureFest,
Suleyman stated: BEarlier this year, in February, we
launched our first business that’s facing outwards, looking
at how we can deploy our technologies to radically trans-
form the NHS, digitize, and then help better organize and
run the National Health Service [42].^ DeepMind’s
website pertaining to Streams was also updated, to state
BWe’re building an infrastructure that will help drive in-
novation across the NHS, ultimately allowing clinicians,
patients and other developers to more easily create, inte-
grate and use a broad range of new services^ [43].
3.3 Riding high above regulatory streets
When Royal Free transferred millions of patient records to
DeepMind in November 2015, it was done without consulting
relevant public bodies. The UK has an Information
Commissioner’s Office (ICO), responsible for enforcing the
Data Protection Act. The Health Research Authority (HRA)
provides a governance framework for health research, and pro-
vides a path for the release of confidential health information in
the absence of explicit consent, through the Confidentiality
Advisory Group (CAG). The Medicines and Healthcare prod-
ucts Regulatory Agency (MHRA) regulates medical devices.
None of these bodies were approached about the November
2015 data transfer [44]: not for informal advice from the ICO;
not to go through an official and required device registration
process with the MHRA before starting live tests of Streams at
Royal Free in December 2015 [44]; and not to go through the
HRA’s CAG, which could have been a vehicle for legitimizing
many aspects of the project [45]. (DeepMind has subsequently
been in discussion with all of these parties in reference to its
Royal Free collaboration and, for several months from
July 2016, stopped using Streams until the MHRA-required
self-registration process was completed. [46] )
Instead, the parties went through just one third-party
check before transferring the data: the ‘information gover-
nance toolkit’ [47], a self-assessment form required by
NHS Digital (formerly HSCIC) [48], designed to validate
the security of the technical infrastructure DeepMind
would be using [49]. The same tool has been used for
self-assessment by some 1500 external parties. The tool
assists organizations to check that their computer systems
are capable of handling NHS data, but it does not consider
any of the properties of data transfers such as those
discussed in this paper. NHS Digital conducted a routine
desktop review of DeepMind’s toolkit submission in
December 2015 (after data had been transferred) and ap-
proved that the third-party datacenter contracted by Google
had adequate security [50]. Beyond this surface check,
NHS Digital made no other enquiries. It subsequently con-
firmed the security of the external datacenter with an on-
site check, but it was beyond the scope of NHS Digital’s
role to assess the flow of data between Royal Free and
Google or to examine any other parts of Google or any
aspect of the data sharing agreements [50].
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While the DeepMind-Royal Free project does have a
self-assessed Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) [51], as
recommended by the ICO [52], the assessment commenced
on 8 October 2015 [53], only after the ISAwas signed, i.e.
once the rules were already set. The PIA also failed to give
any consideration to the historical data trove that was
transferred under the ISA, as well as omitting to discuss
privacy impacts on patients who never have the requisite
blood test or otherwise proceed through the AKI algorithm
that Streams uses, but whose data is in DeepMind’s
servers, and which is formatted, structured, and prepared
for repurposing anyway. That is to say, it neglected to deal
with the primary privacy issues, as well as to justify the
failure to address basic data processing principles such as
data minimization. At the time of publication, the ICO was
investigating the data transfer (primarily on whether data
protection law requirements have been satisfied) [54], as
was the National Data Guardian (primarily on the adequa-
cy of the ‘direct care’ justification for processing) [55]. The
only remaining health regulator in the picture is the Care
Quality Commission (CQC), which gave a statement in
October 2016 indicating the CQC would consider re-
ported data breaches to the ICO as part of its own
inspections, but otherwise declined to comment on the
data transfer, indicating that it was broadly supportive
of experimentation with big data-based care solutions Bif
they will lead to people getting higher quality care
without undermining patient confidentiality^ [56].
One year after data started to flow from Royal Free to
DeepMind, the basic architecture of the deal had not visibly
changed. On the other hand, subsequent deals between
DeepMind and other London medical institutions, this time
for research rather than direct patient care, were announced in
a way that avoided many of the same questions. In these
arrangements, data was anonymized before being transferred
to DeepMind, and research approval (which raises separate
issues, as discussed further below) was sought and gained
before any research work commenced. Crucially, DeepMind
and its partners were clear about the purposes and amount of
data that would be transferred in those deals.
4 Assessing the damage
The most striking feature of the DeepMind-Royal Free ar-
rangement is the conviction with which the parties have
pursued a narrative that it is not actually about artificial
intelligence at all, and that it is all about direct care for
kidney injury—but that they still need to process data on
all the Trust’s patients over a multi-year period. This is
hardly a recipe for great trust and confidence, particularly
given that the arrangement involves largely unencumbered
data flows, both with one company, DeepMind, whose
raison d’être is artificial intelligence; and its parent,
Google, the world’s largest advertising company, that has
long coveted the health market [57]. Combined with the
unavoidable fact that a sizeable number of patients never
need care for kidney injury, the absence of any public con-
sideration of patient privacy and agency, and the lack of
safeguards to prioritize public goods and interests over
private ones, there are reasons to see the deal as more
damaging than beneficial.
Large digital technology companies certainly have the po-
tential to improve our healthcare systems. However, given the
sensitivity of building public trust in emerging technology
domains, in order for innovation to deliver over the long-term,
it must advance in a way that meets and exceeds existing
regulatory frameworks and societal expectations of fair treat-
ment and value. Not doing so will only hinder the adoption
and growth of beneficial technology.
In this section, we identify a number of salutary lessons
from the case study, assessing their implications for
DeepMind, in particular, and for current and future directions
in healthcare, more generally. These lessons draw on the
themes of consent, transparency, privatization and power.
Our ambition is to span from the details presented in the pre-
vious two sections towards the broader dynamics at play, both
in the present deal and in the longer-term ambitions of AI-
driven medical tools. The DeepMind-Royal Free deal is fast
being converted from an optimistic mistake into a long-term
partnership. What are the implications, both for this deal and
for others that loom?
The significance of this case study is not only that there are
retrospective and grave concerns about the justifiability of
DeepMind’s continued holding of data on millions of citizens.
The case study also offers a prism on the future. It offers one
angle into how public institutions and the public at large are
presently equipped to grapple with the promised rise of data-
driven tools in domains such as medicine and public health.
And it tests our assumptions and responses to Google/
Alphabet and other speculative private prospectors of this al-
gorithmic age—‘New Oil’, ‘New Rail’, ‘New Pharma’, we
could say––as they transition from web-based markets, into
land- and body-based markets.
4.1 The conversation we need
It was only after an independent journalistic investiga-
tion revealed the necessary information—seven months
after DeepMind and Royal Free first entered into a data
sharing agreement, five months after the data had been
transferred into DeepMind’s control and during which
product development and testing had commenced, and
two months after the project had been publicly an-
nounced––that any public conversation occurred about
the nature, extent and limits of the DeepMind-Royal
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Free data transfer. Despite the shortcomings in the
deal’s structure, if DeepMind and Royal Free had en-
deavored to inform past and present patients of plans
for their data, initially and as they evolved, either
through email or by letter, much of the subsequent fall-
out would have been mitigated. A clear lesson of this
whole arrangement is that attempts to deliver public
healthcare services should not be launched without dis-
closing the details, documentation, and approvals—the
legal bedrock—of the partnerships that underlie them.
This lesson applies no less to companies offering algo-
rithmic tools on big datasets than it does to pharmaceu-
tical and biotech companies.
The failure on both sides to engage in any conversation
with patients and citizens is inexcusable, particularly in the
British context, in the wake of the 2013 Caldicott review into
information governance practices [34], the very public and
profoundly damaging 2013–15 failure of the government’s
care.data data sharing scheme [58], the 2014 recommenda-
tions of the National Data Guardian in the wake of the
care.data debacle [59], and the 2015 Nuffield Council report
on bioethics [60]. The clear take-away from these reports and
recommendations––and indeed the entire regulatory apparatus
around healthcare––is that patients should be able to under-
stand when and why their health data is used, with realistic
options for effective choice [61]. Patients should not be hear-
ing about these things only when they become front-page
scandals [62].
The DeepMind-Royal Free data deal may be just one trans-
action, but it holds many teachings. To sum up:
1) We do not know––and have no power to find out––what
Google and DeepMind are really doing with NHS patient
data, nor the extent of Royal Free’s meaningful control
over what Google and DeepMind are doing;
2) Any assurances about use of the dataset come from public
relations statements, rather than independent oversight or
legally binding documents;
3) The amount of data transferred is far in excess of the
requirements of those publicly stated needs, but not in
excess of the information sharing agreement and broader
memorandum of understanding governing the deal, both
of which were kept private for many months;
4) The data transfer was done without consulting relevant
regulatory bodies, with only one superficial assessment
of server security, combined with a post-hoc and inade-
quate privacy impact assessment;
5) None of the millions of identified individuals in the
dataset were either informed of the impending transfer
to DeepMind, nor asked for their consent;
6) The transfer relies on an argument that DeepMind is in a
Bdirect care^ relationship with each patient that has been
admitted to Royal Free constituent hospitals, even though
DeepMind is developing an app that will only conceiv-
ably be used in the treatment of one sixth of those indi-
viduals; and
7) More than 12 months into the deal being made, no regu-
lator had issued any comment or pushback.
If account is not taken of these lessons, it could
result in harms beyond the breach of patients’ rights
to confidentiality and privacy––though these elements
in themselves should be enough to demand a regulatory
response. Some of the potential risks posed by unregu-
lated, black box algorithmic systems include misclassi-
fication, mistreatment, and the entrenchment and exac-
erbation of existing inequalities. It does not take an
active imagination to foresee the damage that computa-
tional errors could wreak in software applied to
healthcare systems. Clearly, the same skills and re-
sources must be devoted to the examination and valida-
tion of data-driven tools as to their creation.
Without scrutiny (and perhaps even encouraged com-
petition) Google and DeepMind could quickly obtain a
monopolistic position over health analytics in the UK
and internationally. Indeed, the companies are already
in key positions in policy discussions on standards and
digital reform. If a comprehensive, forward-thinking and
creative regulatory response is not envisaged now,
health services could find themselves washed onwards
in a tide of efficiency and convenience, controlled more
by Google than by publicly-mind health practitioners.
Aggregating and centralizing control of health data and
its analysis will generate levers that exist beyond dem-
ocratic control, with no guarantees except for corporate
branding and trust as to where they might end up.
It is important to reflect on these scenarios not as a predic-
tion of what will come to pass, but as a vision of the potential
danger if policymakers and regulators do not engage with
digital entrants such as DeepMind and incumbents such as
Google. There may be other, worse outcomes. To demand that
innovation be done in a principled manner is not to stand in its
way––it is to save it.
4.2 Data protection
DeepMind and Royal Free have coalesced on the justi-
fication of direct care and implied consent to seek to
justify the sharing of the Royal Free dataset [48, 17,
32]. Although this is the only available basis for them
to justify the data transferred in November 2015, it sets
a dangerous precedent for the future. To understand
why, we need to step through the UK data protection
and medical information governance frameworks.
Under the UK Data Protection Act, DeepMind needs
to comply with a set of data protection principles,
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including having a legitimate basis at all times for pro-
cessing information that can identify an individual [63].
Health information is classed as ‘sensitive personal data’
under this law [64], and is subject to additional safe-
guards [65]. For DeepMind, legitimate processing of
health information comes down to one of two alterna-
tives. Either it requires explicit consent from the indi-
vidual concerned, which DeepMind does not have, or
DeepMind must show that its processing is Bnecessary
for medical purposes^ (defined as Bthe purposes of pre-
ventative medicine, medical diagnosis, medical research,
the provision of care and treatment and the management
of healthcare services^) and Bundertaken by (a) a med-
ical professional; or (b) a person who in the circum-
stances owes a duty of confidentiality which is equiva-
lent to that which would arise if that person were a
health professional^ [66].
Simply using health data for the purpose of specula-
tive and abstract Bmedical purposes^ does not satisfy
data protection law. This is where the medical informa-
tion governance architecture—the so-called Caldicott
principles and guidelines [34]—come into play. Before
turning to these rules, it is important to address an out-
standing core issue in the data protection aspects of the
Royal Free-DeepMind project.
Data protection law relies on a key distinction between
‘data controllers’ and ‘data processors’ [67]. A data con-
troller is defined as Ba person who (either alone or jointly
or in common with other persons) determines the purposes
for which and the manner in which any personal data are,
or are to be, processed^, while a data processor is Bany
person (other than an employee of the data controller)
who processes the data on behalf of the data controller^
[68]. It is crucial to define controller and processor status
in any information sharing arrangement because legal ob-
ligations and liabilities flow from it [69], with significant
real-world consequences [70]. In essence, data controllers
bear primary responsibility for complying with the princi-
ples of data protection, for accommodating data subject
rights and other requirements, and are liable for damages
in case of non-compliance.
The ISA between Royal Free and DeepMind states at
a number of points that Royal Free is the data controller,
while DeepMind is merely a data processor. While this is
clearly the intention of the parties, the legal question is
one of substance, not form. The substantial issue turns
on applying the provisions of the DPA, particularly pa
ragraphs 11–12 of Schedule 1, Part II. These provisions
require, respectively, under paragraph 11 that a data pro-
cessor provide sufficient guarantees and compliance in
respect of the technical and organizational security mea-
sures governing the processing to be carried out and,
under paragraph 12, that the processing be carried out
under a contract, made or evidenced in writing, under
which the processor Bis to act only on instructions from
the data controller .^
It seems clear that Royal Free have contracted with
DeepMind to analyze complex data and come up with solu-
tions by applying DeepMind’s own expertise in analysis to an
extent that Royal Free cannot begin to do. Apart from the
parties’ consensus on the overall purpose of processing––to
assist in monitoring AKI using the nationally-mandated AKI
algorithm––DeepMind seems to have considerable discretion,
in addition to Royal Free, to determine the purposes and man-
ner in which any personal data is processed. The company is
storing, structuring and formatting the Trust-wide dataset, test-
ing it, preparing to deliver data and visualizations to clinician’s
devices and, most recently, discussing technical infrastructure
that could enable it to be repurposed. These factors all point
very strongly to DeepMind assuming the role of a joint data
controller. Certainly, Royal Free, in its responses to investiga-
tions and freedom of information requests, has never provided
any specific awareness or understanding of the means of
DeepMind’s processing.
Further, even if DeepMind were to avoid the substantive
factual conclusion that it is determining the purposes and man-
ner of data processing, the document that is said to constrain
DeepMind’s processing—the ISA—has a number of short-
comings that undermine its status as a ‘contract’ satisfying
the mandatory requirements for data controller-processor re-
lationships in Schedule 1, Part II, paragraph 12 of the DPA.
The contract plausibly extends to a wide range of health tools
for any health condition, without overriding controls from
Royal Free. There is an absence of evidence in writing that
DeepMind will act only on instructions from Royal Free, that
data will not be linked with other datasets held by Google or
DeepMind, or that the data will not be repurposed for other
uses. It is irrelevant whether or not the parties would actually
do any of these things. Assurances from the parties are not
what matters here––what matters is what is stated in the
document that purports to be the governing contract.
Finally, the status of the document as a contract is di-
minished by its absence of any discussion of consider-
ation passing between the entities.
DeepMind cannot be converted to being a pure data
processor by having both parties sign an agreement declar-
ing that this is its status, no matter how much the parties
might wish it [71]. The situation is analogous to the exam-
ple given by the ICO of a sharing agreement between a car
rental service and a tracking company that helps ensure
that cars are returned [70]. The agreement allows the track-
ing company to hold customer location data for a set peri-
od. However, the ICO states that because the tracking com-
pany applies its own secret knowledge in deciding the data
to collect and how to analyze it, the fact that the rental
company determines the overall purpose of tracking (i.e.
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car recovery) is not sufficient to make the tracking compa-
ny a processor. Addressing and resolving the status of
DeepMind is crucial, and is presumably a core dimension
of the ICO’s ongoing investigations of the deal. In our
assessment, it is clearly arguable that DeepMind is a joint
data controller along with Royal Free. It is unfortunate that
the ICO had not yet made a clear determination to resolve
the question of legal status in over 12 months after the deal
commenced, leaving individual rights and organizational
responsibility hanging in the balance.
4.3 Caldicott guidelines
The Caldicott rules help reduce the friction on data sharing
of identifiable health information for direct patient care,
while ensuring that other uses of such information—indi-
rect care, such as research on identifiable individuals or
risk prediction and stratification––are accorded sufficiently
strong regard to legal obligations of privacy and confiden-
tiality. In relation to Streams, the argument made by
Google and Royal Free—and their only arguable basis
for continuing to process the totality of data made available
under the ISA—is that DeepMind is in a direct patient care
relationship with all Royal Free patients. The assertion
seems to be that, since any Royal Free patient may deteri-
orate with AKI in the future, the hospitals are justified in
sharing the superset of everyone’s medical information
wi th Google now, jus t in case a pa t ien t needs
DeepMind’s services in the future. To this the odd claim
is added that Bwith any clinical data processing platform it
is quite normal to have data lying in storage^ [72], without
acknowledging necessary legal and ethical limits to such a
claim. This line of reasoning is unsustainable if ‘direct
care’ is to have any useful differentiating meaning from
‘indirect care’. By the same argument, DeepMind would
be justified in holding all the data on every patient in
the NHS, on the basis that one of those patients, one
day, might require direct clinical treatment through
Streams [73].
DeepMind’s situation has no clear direct analogy in the
Caldicott guidelines. Usually when speaking of the implied
consent inherent in direct care relationships, the guidelines
describe scenarios where registered clinical professionals
acting as part of a clinical team, all with a legitimate rela-
tionship with the patient, pass relevant patient data be-
tween themselves, e.g., a surgeon passing a patient to a
post-operation nurse [34, 74]. Implied consent in these
scenarios is easily justified. It builds on the core relation-
ship between a patient and a clinical professional, within
which tools—including software tools, record management
systems, alert and analytics systems, etc.—can be intro-
duced in the service of patient care. There are also
safeguards, such as that complaints can be made to the
General Medical Council.
For individuals who are escalated to clinical interven-
tion based on the results of applying the AKI algorithm
after a preliminary blood test, clearly this direct care sce-
nario applies. However, for the remainder of patients
whose data has been transferred to DeepMind, no plausible
necessity for DeepMind’s processing of their data arises. It
is, instead, a classic situation of health services manage-
ment, preventative medicine, or medical research that ap-
plies to the overall provision of services to a population as
a whole, or a group of patients with a particular condition.
This is the very definition of indirect care [34]. Lawful
processing of identifiable data for indirect care, if there is
no consent, can only proceed under what is termed the
‘statutory gateway’––i.e. under section 251 of the NHS
Act 2006 (UK) and The Health Service (Control of
Patient Information) Regulations 2002. In effect, s.251 al-
lows third-parties to bypass the impracticality of gaining
consent from large numbers of patients to process their
data, by asking the Secretary of State for Health on the
patients’ behalf through the HRA CAG approval process.
It is notable that the process that Royal Free and DeepMind
assert is necessary here—of storing, structuring and for-
matting trust- or hospital-wide datasets in order to then
effectively deliver clinical care to a subset of patients—
does not naturally fall into any of the envisaged s.251 cir-
cumstances in which confidential patient information may
be processed [75].
A final element in addition to the hard legal arguments
about consent and the ICO, and direct care and the Data
Guardian, is notice. Notice is not a mandatory require-
ment under the DPA if data is lawfully repurposed, but
it is necessary if data is being processed for a new pur-
pose [76]. This would be the case, at the very least, for
patients who are in the transferred dataset, but who are
never tested and treated for kidney injury. Though at the
broadest level Royal Free is engaged in repurposing data
acquired for medical purposes, in this case, to argue that
this data is legitimately being repurposed en masse in the
DeepMind deal undermines wholly the protections
afforded to such sensitive data in both the DPA and the
Caldicott rules.
As a partial acknowledgment of this, in May 2016
Royal Free highlighted that an opt-out exists to data sha
ring with Google/DeepMind [17]. However, the opt-out
was only made clear after public attention had been called
to the deal. Such an after-the-fact concession strikes as
poor compensation, and is inconsistent with the practice
of other hospitals in endeavors of similar reach. Take for
example the 2015 Connecting Care project, comprising
Bristol, North Somerset and South Gloucestershire hospi-
tals [77]. This project involved a more sound basis for
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population-wide data sharing based on implied consent,
because it concerned various third-party providers being
linked to provide an electronic patient record system. A
mass mailing of information on the parties involved, and
reasons for data processing, to all individuals in the com-
munity was undertaken as a key exercise to inform and
allow individuals to opt out, and was followed up with
ongoing efforts to inform patients. Though this project
was more involved than the Royal Free-DeepMind deal,
it also had a more legitimate reason for extending
across the entire population of constituent hospitals.
Royal Free has not justified why a similar process did
not take place with its arrangements with Google.
Given Streams is characterized as a clinical app, there
are more elegant––and less legally and ethically dubi-
ous––solutions available than simply running a mirror
copy of the Royal Free’s repository of patient data on
third-party servers controlled by DeepMind, for every sin-
gle hospital patient, entirely independently of AKI sus-
ceptibility and diagnosis. One solution is for DeepMind
to pull in historical data only on patients who have had
the gateway blood test that is prerequisite for AKI diag-
nosis. If Royal Free’s systems cannot currently handle real
time data requests in this manner, they ought to. It seems
in the essence of an ethical and legal streaming service
that just as a patient’s relevant blood tests from Royal
Free ‘stream’ to DeepMind’s servers, so should historical
data on the identified at-risk patients.
Below, we unpack the implications of these points
with a focus on transparency, data value, and market
power. There has been an inexcusable institutional delay
in the NHS, ICO and Data Guardian’s response to the
issues discussed so far. The remainder of this section
exposes how ill-equipped our institutions are to deal
with the challenges ahead.
4.4 Transparency and the one-way mirror
At the heart of this deal is a core transparency paradox.
Google knows a lot about all of us. For millions of pa-
tients in the Royal Free’s North London catchment, it now
has the potential to know even more. Yet, when the tables
are turned, we know very little about Google. Once our
data makes its way onto Google-controlled servers, our
ability to track that data––to understand how and why
decisions are made about us––is at an end. Committed
investigative reporting has led to documentation describ-
ing the DeepMind-Royal Free data transfer being made
public, but we still have no real knowledge of what hap-
pens once the data reaches DeepMind, nor many tools to
find out.
The public’s situation is analogous to being interrogated
through a one-way mirror: Google can see us, but we
cannot see it [78, 79]. The company benefits from relying
on commercial secrets and the absence of public law obli-
gations and remedies against it. This leaves it with few
incentives for accountability. Only when it collides with
institutions that have obligations to account—i.e. when it
makes data sharing arrangements with Royal Free, or it
applies for approval to NHS Digital––do rules such as the
UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 permit some cracks
in the glass.
This particular case study, and the way that it has
unfolded, demonstrates the clear absence of strong tools
to require companies to account in the same way as
public institutions—even if they aspire to deliver, and
in some cases even overtake, public services. There are
many parallels to another contemporary policy issue in-
volving Google: its application of a 2014 European
court ruling requiring the company to delist information
that is retrieved on name searches from its search en-
gine when that information is not of public interest and
is shown to have lost relevance, accuracy or timeliness
[80]. In that case too, the one-way mirror has conceded
only cracks of knowledge. The tools of discovery, to
inform the public about privately-run services with deep
impacts on their lives, are vastly unequal to the power
that Google wields.
4.5 Corporate responsibility
Even without portholes through which to examine the opera-
tions of powerful technology companies in detail, there is still
a lot more that can be done, both from corporations them-
selves, and from the institutions that are mandated to oversee
them. The deal-making between DeepMind and public insti-
tutions continues to be secretive. This is inappropriate for a
system that typically requires open tender and disclosure. The
purpose and terms of these deals should be made transparent,
before committing populations of millions to them. They
should clearly lay out the public benefit of their works, as well
as the private benefits—what is in it for Google, for
DeepMind? What initiatives have been made towards ensur-
ing ongoing and equitable benefit-sharing? How are procure-
ment rules and restrictions satisfied? While total transparency
of processes is not possible, transparency of purpose and
means must be—legitimizing, in detail, the company’s rea-
sons and limits in holding sensitive data. To its credit,
DeepMind’s announcement of deals subsequent to Royal
Free have moved in this direction; although peer reviewers
still question issues of consent [81], and the lack of details
around the algorithmic processes to be applied [82].
DeepMind has taken steps towards self-regulation. When
DeepMind announced Streams in February 2016, it also an-
nounced the creation of a board of what it termed ‘indepen-
dent reviewers’––nine prominent public figures in the fields of
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technology and medicine in the UK—to scrutinize the
company’s work with the NHS [83, 84]. The board met for
the first time in June 2016. The board is ostensibly reviewing
DeepMind’s activities in the public interest, but as at the end
of January 2017, it had not made any minutes or account of its
discussions public, nor had any reviewers expressed any con-
cerns about DeepMind’s arrangements publicly. Annual state-
ments are envisaged. Oversight of artificial intelligence as it is
applied to healthcare is obviously desirable. But a self-
appointed oversight board, arguably paid in the currency of
reputational gain by association with successful technology
companies, is far from adequate in itself. Being hand-chosen
by DeepMind, the members of the board are unlikely to have
positions fundamentally at odds with the company. It would
also be a considerable about-face to denounce the whole ar-
rangement with a partner such as Royal Free. At best, the
board will supplement institutional external oversight mecha-
nisms and provide insights not readily gained by outsiders: for
example, access to internal data; independent assessments of
internal arrangements for data handling, privacy and security;
empirical insights into the attitudes of employees and the pro-
tection of the public interest. At worst, however, such a board
risks creating a vacuum around truly independent and rightly
skeptical critique and understanding.
The question of how to make technology giants such as
Google more publicly accountable is one of the most pressing
political challenges we face today. The rapid diversifi-
cation of these businesses from web-based services into
all sorts of aspects of everyday life—energy, transport,
healthcare—has found us unprepared. But it only em-
phasizes the need to act decisively.
Machine learning tools offer great promise in helping to
navigate complex information spaces, environments and
work flows that are beyond the reach of any one clinician
or team. However, it is essential that the supply chain of
data and humans leading to any machine learning tools are
comprehensible and queryable. This is a check on the im-
pulse of technology startups that want to ‘move fast and
break things’. While there is little doubt that individuals at
DeepMind do care about improving the situation at Royal
Free and across the NHS generally, the young company is
clearly interested in moving fast—as are Royal Free’s cli-
nicians. ‘The faster we move, the more lives we can save’,
goes the logic. This may be true, but it injects several
elements of dangerous risk, and potentially hazardous
breakages, in developing these new tools: first, that the
tools will provide misleading and harmful advice in edge
cases; and second, that public trust and confidence in arti-
ficial intelligence erodes, making it harder to carry out
projects in the future in sensitive areas, despite their prom-
ised benefits. Aligning the development and operation of
artificial intelligence products with human-scale account-
ability and explanation will be a challenge. But the
alternative is to abdicate ourselves to systems that, when
they break, will not explain themselves to us.
It is worth noting that in digesting our medical records and
histories, machine learning systems have the potential to un-
cover new hypotheses and trends about us, as a population,
that are difficult to adapt to and deal with. It may turn out, for
instance, that certain kinds of people are particularly suscep-
tible to requiring an expensive medical intervention over the
course of their lives. Regulations should require that the bur-
dens of new discoveries not fall solely on the shoulders
of those individuals who happen to need the interven-
tion. There is a risk that, if we do not understand how
companies like DeepMind draw knowledge from our
data, we will not be prepared for the implications of
the knowledge when it arrives.
It is essential that society is prepared for these new-
found patterns, and able to protect those people who
find themselves newly categorized and potentially disad-
vantaged. This newfound understanding of our condition
will leave us all better off, but only if we share the
burdens that the discoveries will place on individuals.
4.6 Privatization and value for data
Even if DeepMind had been more open about its Royal Free
data deal, as it was in subsequent research deals, questions still
remain about the value that flows to the British public from
these deals. DeepMind has made public two other partner-
ships with the NHS, both—unlike with Royal Free—for re-
search rather than patient care, with actual involvement of AI,
and with appropriate research approvals. One, with
Moorfields Eye Hospital in London [85], involves the AI
company receiving one million anonymized eye scans which
it will run through its machine learning algorithms in search of
new patterns of degeneration that might allow disease to be
caught earlier [86]. Like the Royal Free collaboration, it com-
menced in July 2015 [87], when aMoorfields ophthalmologist
approached DeepMind with a research question: can deep
learning be used to diagnose age related macular degeneration
or diabetic retinopathy? Approval to work on anonymized
data was granted by Moorfields in October 2015 and the first
part of an approval to work on pseudonymized data came in
June 2016, at the same time as a research protocol was also
published in an open access journal [88]. Ethical approval was
granted, but it is worth noting that it was confined to looking at
the risk of adverse patient events, not at broader questions
such as the future for jobs, for competition, human deskilling,
etc [82].7 The Moorfields project was announced publicly in
July 2016. While other hospitals and startups can pursue
7 As one reviewer remarked: “Overall a novel concept and worth exploring as
it will be able to replace human workforce if successful”.
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similar projects, Moorfields sees more patients a year than any
other eye hospital in the US or Europe.
The second partnership, with UCL Hospitals NHS
Foundation Trust, sees DeepMind receiving 700 anonymized
radiography scans [89]. The AI company is attempting to im-
prove how treatment is planned for head and neck cancer, by
speeding up scan segmentation––the process of deciding where
and how to direct radiation in order to maximize impact to can-
cerous cells and minimize harm to healthy tissue. At the moment
an expert radiologist needs to label images pixel-by-pixel, with a
28 day wait-time, for a four hour process [40]. DeepMind re-
ceived approval to work on anonymized data in April 2016, with
its research protocol published August 2016 [90].
The assumption is that DeepMind’s technical capability
will let it discover new things about analyzing medical imag-
ery, and that those new modes of analysis will be shared back
to the community. However, documents binding DeepMind’s
agreement with Moorfields and UCL, and the terms of data
sharing, were not public as at October 2016. We do know that
DeepMind will keep all algorithms that are developed during
the studies. In other words, the knowledge DeepMind extracts
from these public resources will belong exclusively to
DeepMind. Even if it publishes the scientific results of its
studies, it is unlikely it will freely publish the algorithms it
has trained. In effect, the chance to train and exploit algo-
rithms on real-world health data is DeepMind’s consideration
for these deals. The consideration for its partners is that those
algorithms––and the promise that they advance the field of
diagnostics––exist in the world. Given this, the opacity of
consideration passing between the parties in this, as with the
contract with Royal Free, is problematic. There are no details
on the clinical service and cost of any service to be provided
by DeepMind in exchange for the data access, only vague
statements that have been made in public fora about the pos-
sibility of a future levy being imposed, in alignment with
improvements in clinical outcomes.
4.7 Open competition and public interest
Offering DeepMind a lead advantage in developing new algo-
rithmic tools on otherwise privately-held, but publicly-generated
datasets limits the adoption of any scientific advances the com-
panymaymake to two channels: via DeepMind on DeepMind’s
terms; or to recreating, at expense and with unclear routes to
access, DeepMind’s training on the same datasets.
Concepts of the value of data have not yet permeated popular
culture. Google and other technology companies know very well
what value they can unlock from a particular dataset and from
access to millions or billions of computers that stream data on
how their human owners walk, talk, travel and think.
But the public, and by extension the public sector, do
not yet contemplate the value of this commodity that only
they are capable of creating. Without people, there is no
data. Without data, there is no artificial intelligence. It is a
great stroke of luck that business has found a way to mon-
etize a commodity that we all produce just by living our
lives. Ensuring we get value from the commodity is not a
case of throwing barriers in front of all manner of data
processing. Instead, it should focus on aligning public
and private interests around the public’s data, ensuring that
both sides benefit from any deal [91].
The value embodied in these NHS datasets does not
belong exclusively to the clinicians and specialists who
have made deals with DeepMind. It also belongs to the
public who generated it in the course of treatment. There
is a pressing need for the NHS to consult broadly on the
value-for-data aspects of these transfers, to ensure that the
British public gets the best possible value out of any fu-
ture deal. This value might take the form of an NHS stake
in any products that DeepMind, a for-profit company, de-
velop and sell using NHS data. It could be as simple as a
binding agreement to share any future products with the
entire NHS at a discount, or for free. It is inappropriate to
leave these matters for future discussion, risking lock-in.
There may even be scenarios where third-party processors
can use NHS data to build products that are not related to
health, but are useful in other markets. The public has a
revulsion against ‘selling’ NHS data, but this impulse
sells the public short on its own assets. The Royal Free-
Google deal suggests that data will flow in any event,
under the banner of innovation, without any value-for-
money discussions. We recommend that, in addition to
formalizing inputs on these aspects of value, the NHS
might also consider the intrinsic impacts of automation
[92]—how will clinicians interface with these new tools?
How will the NHS deal with inevitable deskilling and
shifts in the workforce, in response to automation? How
will they ensure that the daily art of medicine is as
protected and valued as the science?
A properly resourced and truly independent entity or
entities should be tackling these challenges. Perhaps the
Council of Data Science Ethics and standing Commission
on Artificial Intelligence, recommended—and, in the first
case, accepted by the government [93]—under two reports
of the UK House of Commons Science and Technology
Committee [94, 95], will be able to undertake this task,
but their independence and rigor must be proven. They
must also take into account the fact that DeepMind con-
tinues to rapidly expand its staff, including with senior
appointments from the ranks of government and the
NHS itself [96, 97].
4.8 Market power
The new phenomenon of using machine learning to extract
value from health data is likely the precursor of a general
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movement to monetize public datasets. Centralized go-
vernment services are obvious targets for machine lear-
ning. They are directed towards fundamental human needs
of care, housing, education and health, and often hold long
baseline datasets about human behavior in areas where
services could be improved. The complexity and scale of
this information is what has led to the suggestion that these
are areas where the sheer force of computation and algo-
rithmic learning on large volumes of data offers great uti-
lity and promise.
When private companies access these resources with the
intention of building on top of them, first-mover advantage
exists as it does whenever private companies exploit public
resources—land, fossil fuel stores, connection points to peo-
ple’s homes. In the new realm of machine learning, it is im-
portant to ensure that DeepMind’s algorithms do not put it in
an entrenched market position.
Of course, DeepMind is not the only innovator making
overtures to the NHS, and machine learning is not the
only innovation. In the case of kidney injury, outcomes
would be as well influenced by employing more nurses to
ensure that patients are hydrated, as deploying new algo-
rithms. Some healthy caution about the first-mover is ad-
vised. If our public services have not laid the groundwork
for an open, flourishing future innovation ecosystem, then
the temptation for players like DeepMind to sit on their
entrenched networks will be too strong.
It is important to note that, while giving DeepMind
access to NHS data does not in principle preclude the
same access being given to other companies in future,
the willingness to recreate work, and ability to catch up,
will diminish over time. Already, anecdotally, startups are
reluctant to move in places where DeepMind has started
deploying its immense resources. The danger of uncon-
strained, unreflective allocation of datasets to powerful
parties is that the incentives for competition will distort.
Like physical networks of electricity cables or gas pipes,
it is perfectly possible for another company to redo what
has been done by another. However, there are powerful
inefficiencies and network effects that count against such
possibilities. If we are to see the true promise of artificial
intelligence, a much more positive solution would be to
heavily constrain the dataset and to introduce a competi-
tive, open process for simultaneous technology develop-
ment by a range of private, public, and private-public
providers.
A way of conceptualizing our way out of a single pro-
vider solution by a powerful first-mover is to think about
datasets as public resources, with attendant public owner-
ship interests. Ownership in this context is often a loaded
notion, but it does not need to reduce to something that is
atomized and commoditized for control at the individual
level. Learning from commons movements [98], trusted
institutions and communities appear to be the best vehicles
to advocate for individual rights, rather than placing the
burden of ownership on individuals. The key then is to
return value at the communal level [99]. Indeed, data held
by NHS trusts ought to be perfectly positioned for this
treatment.
Hospitals are a community dedicated to the care of
their patients. The first step for DeepMind and Royal
Free should have been to engage the community in
explaining the solutions they will pursue, and achieving
buy-in with communal control and reward. The second
step would have been to expand this with other alterna-
tives in a flourishing innovative ecosystem. This did not
happen, and it does not look like it will happen. In this
regard, it is important to note that offering functionality
for patients to see and audit their own data as it moves
through systems [100, 101], as DeepMind has intimated
that it will do in the future, is a positive development,
but it is also one that resigns itself to perpetuating ulti-
mate control, and a power asymmetry, in the hands of
those who control the system—in this case, DeepMind.
None of the approaches of DeepMind, of Google, or of
the industry-supported Partnership on Artif icial
Intelligence that they announced in 2016, do anything
to mitigate this control. They trumpet their own good
intents, in benefiting the many in open, responsible, so-
cially engaged ways that avoid undesirable outcomes
[102]. But ultimately, these are tweaks within the frame
of a certain deterministic approach to technology. They
look for corporate initiative, not for robust solutions that
stand outside our present paradigm and ask how best we
can truly assure that we advance technologically, and that
we do so in a way that ensures deep and broad public
interests are met, not just superficially immediate, effi-
cient, commercial solutions.
5 Conclusion
The 2015–16 deal between a subsidiary of the world’s
largest advertising company and a major hospital trust in
Britain’s centralized public health service should serve as
a cautionary tale and a call to attention. Through the ve-
hicle of a promise both grand and diffuse––of a streaming
app that will deliver critical alerts and actionable analytics
on kidney disease now, and the health of all citizens in the
future––Google DeepMind has entered the healthcare
market. It has done so without any health-specific domain
expertise, but with a potent combination of prestige, patro
nage and the promise of progress.
Networks of information now rule our professional and
personal lives. These are principally owned and controlled
by a handful of US companies: Google, Facebook,
Health Technol.
Microsoft, Amazon, Apple, IBM. New players cannot
compete with these successful networks, whose influence
deepens and becomes more entrenched as they ingest
more data, more resources. If these born-digital compa-
nies are afforded the opportunity to extend these networks
into other domains of life, they will limit competition
there too. This is what is at stake with Google
DeepMind being given unfettered, unexamined access to
population-wide health datasets. It will build, own and
control networks of knowledge about disease.
Fortunately, health data comes with very strong protec-
tions that are designed to protect individuals and the pub-
lic interest. These protections must be respected before
acceding to any promises of innovation and efficiency
emanating from data processing companies. Public health
services such as the British NHS are deeply complex sys-
tems. It is imperative for such institutions to constantly
explore ways to advance technologically in their public
health mission. Artificial intelligence and machine learn-
ing may well offer great promise. But the special relation-
ship that has surged ahead between Royal Free and
Google DeepMind does not carry a positive message.
Digital pioneers who claim to be committed to the public
interest must do better than to pursue secretive deals and
specious claims in something as important as the health of
populations. For public institutions and oversight mecha-
nisms to fail in their wake would be an irrevocable
mistake.
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